Introduction
It is well documented that the so-called third mission of universities, consisting of transferring knowledge to industry, has real effects on local economic development (Etzkowitz, 2002; Jaffe, 1989) . Such knowledge transfer can be implemented via a number of routes including the hiring of students, sponsored research, licensing, the creation of university spin-off firms or simply via knowledge spillovers (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006) . In this regard, one mechanism that has become increasingly important for researchers and policymakers is patent licensing (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Perkmann et al., 2013) . 5 A question that has aroused considerable interest of late is whether pecuniary incentives to inventors are a useful tool for improving licensing outcomes. In the US, as in most European countries, university intellectual property policies grant the university control rights over inventions (Sampat et al., 2003; Geuna and Rossi, 2011) . The royalty income from inventions is then shared between the inventor and the university according to terms generally specified by the university. This naturally allows (or even forces) universities to decide which pecuniary incentives, in the form of inventor royalty shares, are to be offered to inventors. If inventors care about potential royalties, then universities can conveniently set inventor royalty shares so as to incentivize their effort.
Studies to date, however, present mixed results as to whether such royalty sharing arrangements are effective at incentivizing academics' efforts (Sauermann et al., 2010 , Perkmann et al., 2013 , suggesting that they might be persuasive in certain institutional contexts but not in others (Sauermann et al., 2010) .
The purpose of our paper is to investigate the role of inventor royalty shares in incentivizing patenting and licensing in universities in Portugal and Spain, two countries with specific characteristics that make them an interesting case. First, university patenting and licensing are recent and remain at a low rate. Second, Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) are relatively young and still in an early stage of 5 Patenting and licensing are important components of university technology transfer and have been the focus of many studies in the last two decades. Verspagen (2006) has surveyed the literature on university patenting, while Baldini (2006) has provided a review of the literature on patenting and licensing in universities.
their learning curve. 6 Third, the quality of applied research might not be as high as that in the US. 7 Fourth, both countries have been particularly active over the last few years in developing appropriate infrastructure for improving knowledge transfer (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Lissoni, 2013; Cartaxo and Godinho, 2014) . Among the many measures taken has been the adoption of well-defined royalty sharing schedules by universities.
Here, we seek to determine whether inventor royalty shares have successfully incentivized inventors' efforts in universities in Portugal and Spain, and, if not, what it is that prevents royalty shares from being effective.
We build on the framework proposed by Lach and Schankerman (2008) to analyse the conditions under which inventor royalty shares are likely to be effective. Intuitively, inventors will only care about royalty sharing if the revenues to be shared can be expected to be non-trivial. In this regard, there are three factors that moderate the inventor's expected license revenue: the inventor royalty shares themselves, the effectiveness of the university TTO at commercializing patented inventions (the socalled gatekeeper effect) and the inventor's ability to undertake applied research. Higher inventor royalty shares will serve as a greater incentive if the right interplay exists between the three moderators (i.e., inventor royalty shares are sufficiently high, TTOs are good at commercializing inventions and inventors are good at generating licensable inventions). In contrast, inventor royalty shares will not matter if the licensing game is blocked by a poor interplay between the three moderators (i.e., inventor royalty rates are too low, TTOs are ineffective at commercializing inventions or inventors produce inventions with little commercial value).
Within this framework, we seek to answer two research questions. First, is the interplay between the moderators in Portugal and Spain such that inventor royalty shares are effective at stimulating inventors' efforts and improving university outcomes? Second,
if not, what prevents inventor royalty shares from being effective? Or more specifically:
Are inventor royalty shares poorly chosen by universities? Are TTOs ineffective at commercializing inventions? Are inventors bad at generating licensable inventions?
6 See Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) for a theoretical model of the role of TTOs in licensing university inventions. 7 Both because universities recruit researchers with basic, rather than applied, research profiles and because recruitment practices are not always oriented at recruiting the best available candidates.
In order to empirically answer these research questions we employ a mix of objective evidence from university-level data and subjective evidence from new self-collected surveys addressed to TTOs and inventors. We exploit the content in the different datasets by combining descriptive statistics and econometric analyses.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical setting and derives the research questions of interest. Section 3 offers a review of the institutional context in Portugal and Spain and describes the datasets used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 empirically answers the research questions posed in Section 2. Section 5 concludes.
Analytical setting and research questions
In the traditional "Mertonian" world of scientific discovery, the main goal of the majority of scientists is to establish their priority of discovery by being the first to communicate an advance in knowledge (Stephan, 1996; Lam, 2011) . Accordingly, most scientists seem to be motivated by the traditional reputational and career rewards provided by the scientific community that come in the form of eponymy, prizes and publication (Stephan, 1996; Lam, 2011) . In line with this traditional view of what motivates scientists, some studies conclude that reputation lies at the heart of scientists' decision to patent.
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While it is widely argued in the literature that academics respond to non-pecuniary incentives, recent research has sought to determine whether academics also care about monetary incentives. This growing interest in understanding the role of monetary incentives is closely related to recent measures aimed at improving university technology transfer. Pecuniary incentives are regarded as a potentially effective means involving scientists, not just in discovery, but also in the transfer of the generated knowledge beyond the boundaries of academia (Markman, 2004 ) to generate inventions that will be licensed by the TTO with some 9 We use "ability to do applied research" to refer to the capacity to undertake applied research that can subsequently be exploited economically by patenting and licensing. We could also have used the terms "ability to do relevant or commercially oriented applied research". We admit that scientists can conduct quality applied research that simply may not be suitable for economic exploitation through patenting and licensing.
probability. Here, we seek to consider an additional scenario in which less able scientists ( 0   ) produce inventions with no probability of being licensed by the TTO.
The ability parameter  can be accommodated within Lach and Schankerman's (2008) setting as an interaction with the gatekeeper parameter  . This implies that the expected commercial value associated with a given level of research effort can be attenuated either because the TTO is not good at commercializing ideas or because the inventor is less capable of conducting applied research. Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that optimal basic and applied research efforts These results only hold if the diminishing returns to income in the utility function are not "too strong" and if there is complementarity between basic and applied research efforts. The results still hold for applied research (but not for basic research) even if there is no interaction between applied and basic research.
11 Lach and Schankerman (2008) only provide results for s and  . As mentioned above, a convenient way of accommodating parameter  within their setting is by interacting it with  (i.e., before whenever we had  , we now have  ). This implies that comparative statics results for  naturally extend to  . will therefore only play the licensing game if s ,  and  all take reasonably large values and interact to create the appropriate incentives.
Interaction effects -We are interested in assessing how inventors react to one of the three moderators of an inventor's efforts: namely, royalty shares ( s ). Clearly, however, for these royalty shares to be effective, they need to take meaningfully large values. A second condition to ensure that the inventor royalty shares matter is that  and  must both be at least greater than zero. If they are not, the expected royalties shared out to scientists will always be zero, regardless of the inventor royalty share established. 
Institutional setting and data

Institutional setting
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed US universities to retain intellectual property rights on patents resulting from government funded research and to license these patents on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis (Sampat et al., 2003) . Most European countries have converged towards the US model and abolished the professor's privilege and the adoption of institutional ownership (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Lissoni, 2013) . This is the case of Portugal and Spain where universities retain the ownership of inventions.
Below, we describe the institutional environment in Portugal and Spain in some detail.
Institutional ownership -The Portuguese intellectual property law (Código da
Propriedade Industrial) is devoid of any specific reference to university intellectual property. Universities have traditionally been the sole proprietors of the inventions generated by faculty with statutory legislation not foreseeing the participation of faculty in licensing revenues. The first explicit university-specific intellectual property rights 8 policy with well delimited inventor royalty shares was not adopted until 1998 in the Instituto Superior Técnico. Similar statues were gradually adopted over the following decade, with the vast majority of universities today operating well-defined royalty sharing schemes.
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Spain was one of the first European countries, together with the United Kingdom and Switzerland, to adopt the institutional ownership system (Azagra-Caro, 2011; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). The framework for scientific and patenting activities has been well defined since the 1980s when the University Reform Law allowed university researchers to receive income from contracts with firms, including arrangements that led to patents and licensing (Azagra-Caro, 2011). . Some GAPIs and OTICs were based in previously existing extension offices. In such instances, technology licensing and transfer activities coexist with other tasks (such as mentorship to spin-offs, training or research management). These GAPIs and OTICs tend to employ a larger number of staff, but the figure of no more than two or three technicians engaged in technology transfer remains valid for most universities.
at promoting co-operation between university and industry. 15 OTRIs acquired an official character in 1996 and organized themselves in a network (known as RedOTRI) in 1997.
The number of OTRIs grew substantially after these two events. 15% of all patent grants (almost twice the share in 2000). Although the distribution of patents is strongly skewed, with some universities being particularly active, patenting is not restricted to a specific group of universities and almost all public universities consistently apply for at least one patent per year. Total licensing income (from patented and non-patented technologies) has experienced a similar trend rising from €0.5 million in 2000 to €2.5 million in 2011. Licensing income from patents seems to account for slightly more than one half of total licensing income (with some variations over time).
Royalty sharing schedules -
On average, each Spanish university generated €60,000 of license income per year during the period 2007-2011. 
Data
In order to study the impact of inventor royalty shares on university technology transfer outcomes we use three self-constructed datasets for each country: a university-level dataset, a survey addressed to all Portuguese and Spanish university TTOs and another survey to a representative sample of inventors in Portugal and Spain. Each dataset is described below. . 18 Clearly, the inventor royalty share had to be accurately defined for the university to be included in the sample. Most of the instances in which we had to discard a university-year were because information on outcomes (patents or licensing)
University-level dataset
or the explanatory variable of interest (inventor royalty share) was not available. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each of these variables. Table 3 provides definitions and sources for the different variables.
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3]
The main outcomes of interest (licensing income and number of patent applications) take rather low values and their distribution is highly skewed across universities.
Licensing income in Spain (note no data are available for Portugal) ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of €600,000. Average licensing income is slightly above €60,000 per year, but the median is much lower at €29,600. The average number of annual patent applications is around 10 for both Portugal and Spain. This number is also unevenly distributed across universities with the minimum and maximum values ranging from 0 to 54 in Portugal and 0 to 72 in Spain. The median number of patent applications is slightly below the mean (7.5 in Portugal and 9 in Spain).
Inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain present similar patterns. Figure 1 plots the distribution of royalty shares with average and median values standing at around 55% in both countries. Most universities opt to fix the inventor royalty share at between 50 and 60% with only a few universities opting for extremely low (around 30%) or high (above 70%) royalty shares for inventors.
[
INSERT FIGURE 1]
TTO survey -The main objective of the survey addressed to the TTOs was to obtain the exact inventor royalty share at each university, the year in which royalty shares were first introduced and whether the shares have experienced significant changes over time.
We were also interested in understanding the administrative process by which the royalty sharing schedules were approved at each university and the goals each university pursued with its specified royalty share. Royalty sharing schedules were generally the outcome of a unilateral proposal from the universities' governing councils, with researchers having almost no opportunity to influence the final decision. In most universities the primary goal pursued with the introduction of the royalty sharing schedule was to incentivize an increase in patenting,
while only a few TTOs recognized the importance of maximizing licensing revenues.
We provide more detailed information on the TTO survey in the following section.
Inventors' survey -The primary goal of the survey was to obtain direct feedback from university inventors on the importance of inventor royalty shares. A second goal of the survey was to relate the effectiveness of the royalty shares to measures of inventor quality.
The target of the survey was all Portuguese and Spanish inventors that had applied for at least one patent between the years 2005 and 2009 (both inclusive) at the USPTO, the EPO or the respective national offices (the INPI in Portugal and the OEPM in Spain). In order to approximate this target population as closely as possible, we first retained all the patent applications (to the aforementioned offices) for which the assignee was a Portuguese (555 patent applications) or Spanish (5,148 patent applications) university.
We then located the email addresses of the inventors of these patent applications through personalized Google searches. This yielded 534 email addresses in Portugal and 3,033 in Spain (after dealing with multi-applicant inventors). We invited all the inventors for whom we had an email address to answer an online survey in January 19 Red-OTRI (the network of Spanish TTOs) included 87 members in its 2010 directory. Most of these were ascribed to a university but some were universities without a TTO or TTOs ascribed to centers other than universities (such as scientific institutes and research centers). Most of the scientific research and virtually all the patents and license income are generated by 53 public universities. Therefore, we sent the survey to the TTOs of these universities that constitute our relevant population (47 of which filled it out).
(Portugal) and November (Spain) 2012. We obtained 212 complete responses for Portugal and 606 for Spain (meaning 40 and 20% response rates, respectively).
We asked inventors to supply their individual characteristics (field of research, age, gender, type of contract with the university, rank and measures of quality) and for their opinion on several aspects relating to the effectiveness of royalty shares. 
Evidence
Below we seek to provide empirical answers to the two research questions posed in Section 2. We study whether inventor royalty shares are effective at stimulating inventors' efforts and improving university patenting and licensing outcomes, and then we analyze the role played by the moderators in attenuating the incentive effects expected from inventor royalty shares. In order to tackle these two research questions we draw on information from the university-level dataset and the surveys.
Do inventor royalty shares have an incentive effect in Portugal and Spain?
We first seek to answer this question econometrically using the objective universitylevel dataset. University licensing revenue and the number of projects equals the scientists' expected licensing income and the number of projects times the faculty size 20 Second, higher inventor royalty shares may attract more innovation-oriented faculty (a sorting problem). 21 Unlike in the US, the sorting channel is likely to play a minor role at Portuguese and Spanish universities where faculty mobility is relatively low. In any case, we rely on pre-sample information on patenting by universities to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Table 5 shows equation (1) estimates based on the unbalanced panels of Portuguese and Spanish universities described in Table 1 . 22 Although most universities were observed over several years, we are unable to use within estimators because the royalty share displays little variation over time (only a few universities change royalty shares over time and none of these changes were made during the sample period). Thus, the incentive effect of the royalty share is identified from the cross-sectional variation in the 20 The TTO survey suggests that inventors play a marginal role in the fixing of royalty shares both at Portuguese and Spanish universities. The royalty share was a unilateral proposal from the Governing Council in 41 and 64% of Portuguese and Spanish universities, respectively, with no participation of the researchers. In about a third of the universities in both countries, the royalty share was discussed in the Research Commission, with researchers being given the opportunity to influence the final decision. Only in 32% of Portuguese and 2% of Spanish universities did the researchers play a more active role in the royalty share decision. 21 In this case, the estimated  would be an upward biased estimate of the pure effort component of the royalty shares, but it would remain a consistent estimate of the overall incentive effect (including both the effort and sorting components). 22 These panels only include universities for which all the relevant explanatory variables were available at some point in time (12 Portuguese and 39 Spanish universities). We experimented with a simpler specification with fewer explanatory variables (royalty shares, pre-sample patenting and time dummies) that allowed for broader panels, but the results remained unchanged.
data. We use clustered-robust standard errors to allow for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within universities.
For each country and dependent variable we begin with a parsimonious specification that only includes the royalty share, pre-sample information on patenting by universities to control for unobserved heterogeneity and time dummies (columns 1, 3 and 5). The coefficient associated with the inventor's royalty share is insignificantly different from zero in all cases. Next we expand this specification with a series of additional explanatory variables (columns 2, 4 and 6). Again, the coefficient associated with the inventor's royalty share is insignificantly different from zero in all cases, except column found for the US where there seems to be full awareness of monetary incentives among faculty. 23 The degree of awareness is particularly surprising if we consider our survey was sent out to patent applicants, a subsample of faculty who should apparently be interested in the monetary incentives for commercializing their inventions. Not only is the degree of awareness low, but the majority of respondents claiming to be aware of the royalty shares reported that the share had little or no impact on their decision to generate patentable inventions. Of these, only slightly more than 10% stated that the royalty share was highly influential in incentivizing their research efforts.
[INSERT We have shown in Section 3 that inventor royalty shares are well above zero and, thus, cannot be said to eliminate the inventors' opportunities to earn licensing revenues. We can also confirm that inventors believe the royalty shares to be sufficiently high.
Therefore, if royalty sharing schedules are not blocking the licensing game, then at least one of the other two moderators must be. Below, we discuss the extent to which the other two moderators of inventors' efforts can be held responsible for the ineffectiveness of the royalty shares.
Ineffective inventor royalty share levels -One potential explanation for the absence of any impact could be that inventor royalty shares are poorly chosen. Thus, there might be a certain threshold below which inventor royalty shares are ineffective. Does such a threshold exist and are current inventor royalty shares set below this threshold? Table 7 reports the inventors' opinions regarding the inventor royalty shares. Most of the respondents claiming to be aware of these shares believe them to be high enough to incentivize their effort. Most of the remaining inventors (those who are either unaware of the royalties or those that are aware of them but consider them to be too low) believe that there is a minimum royalty threshold above which it would be worthwhile to increase their effort. Surprisingly, these inventors believe the "effort" threshold to be, on average, below the actual average inventor royalty shares in force.
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Taken together these results suggest that current royalty shares are sufficiently high to incentivize inventors' efforts. This reinforces the perception that either the gatekeeper effect or the quality of the applied research undermines the commercial prospects of the inventions generated. In short, poor commercialization prospects prevent royalty shares from being a useful incentive device.
INSERT TABLE 7]
Gatekeeper effect -As in most European countries, Spanish and Portuguese universities retain ownership of intellectual property rights, with the commercialization of inventions depending ultimately on the TTOs. This means that inventors' licensing revenues are largely dependent on the ability of TTOs to find licensees and to negotiate agreements. As discussed in the analytical setting, if the TTO is ineffective in commercializing inventions, royalty shares will have a smaller incentive effect or no effect at all. Does the TTOs' inability to successfully commercialize inventions account for the ineffectiveness of royalty shares?
An efficient way of empirically testing for the gatekeeper effect in the US has involved exploiting the fact that private universities are more aggressive than their public counterparts in their licensing strategies. 25 This strategy, however, cannot be implemented in Europe where the bulk of universities performing scientific research are public. 26 As such, we have to rely on qualitative information derived from the surveys.
We explicitly asked the TTOs to identify the outcomes they pursue via their royalty sharing schemes. The results to this question (reported in Interestingly, most of the TTOs claim to use the royalty shares to incentivize university patenting and to improve its scientific production. These responses suggest that TTOs are unaware that royalty shares only incentivize enhanced research efforts if accompanied by good commercialization prospects. Indeed, the only way of boosting patenting and scientific production through royalty sharing is via a credible commitment to the maximization of licensing income.
Overall, the feedback from the surveys is consistent with the econometric results reported in Table 5 where the proxies for the quality of the TTO at commercializing inventions (i.e., the size and age of the TTO) are generally found to be not significant (with only age having a positive effect on patenting in Portugal).
Inventors' ability to perform applied research -Inventors would certainly not respond to royalty incentives if their ability to perform applied research was such that their chances of producing licensable inventions were non-existent. We use the inventors' survey to determine whether inventors capable of producing high quality research are better informed about royalty shares and more sensitive to the value of these shares. We construct two dependent variables based on the results reported in Table 9 . In all cases we control for gender, age and a full set of university and field fixed effects.
In columns (1) and (5) The finding that inventors with international patent applications are substantially more aware of the royalties is of particular interest as it suggests that only high quality patents with a good chance of being licensed spur inventors' curiosity for learning about royalty sharing. However, as Table 4 shows, the percentage of inventors with international patent applications in our sample is extremely low (below 10%), which indicates that most inventors are producing patents with little commercial value and, hence, the 27 Sexenios are a supplement to a researcher's salary awarded following evaluation by a national agency (CNEAI, National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity). This evaluation gives substantial weight to publications in international journals listed in the ISI's Journal Citation Reports. In the Spanish research system, sexenios are seen as evidence of scientific excellence and their use has had positive effects on Spain's scientific production (see Jiménez-Contreras et al., 2003).
royalty share does not matter much to them. All in all, it appears that pecuniary incentives would matter more if patents were registered in international offices.
[INSERT 
Conclusions
We have investigated whether inventor royalty shares from patented inventions serve as an effective pecuniary incentive in Portuguese and Spanish universities. Plain regressions on university level datasets indicate that royalty shares have no impact on patenting or licensing income. The same result is obtained when using a new inventors' survey, with most respondents declaring a low degree of awareness of corresponding royalty shares and only a few claiming to be influenced by the inventor royalty share.
We have relied on the responses of inventors and TTOs to the new data surveys to determine why inventor royalty shares are ineffective. These seem to indicate that the current values of the inventor royalty shares are appropriate. Indeed, most inventors claim that the royalty shares established by their university are sufficiently attractive to incentivise their research effort. Despite this, it would seem that inventors are uninfluenced by royalty sharing because of the poor commercial prospects of their inventions. Two reasons can be forwarded to account for these poor expectations.
First, TTOs are not sufficiently focused on commercializing inventions (i.e., finding licensees and negotiating agreements). It should be stressed that in Portugal as in Spain research universities are overwhelmingly public with their TTOs lacking a clear commercial orientation. Indeed, in Portugal some TTOs (see Cartaxo and Godinho, 2014) claim to be much more concerned with regional development and the boosting of local entrepreneurship through university spin-offs than in licensing revenue. In some cases, (non-exclusive) licenses are even offered to local firms without any sort of payment simply to maximize the chances of university-generated knowledge being diffused among local economic agents. A further potential explanation for their lack of interest in maximizing licensing income is that TTOs can rely on other sources of financing, including university funds, revenues from training and consulting services,
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and overheads charged to researchers from European projects. 28 Our surveys addressed to the TTOs reflect this lack of interest in licensing income. Surprisingly, royalty sharing schemes seek to maximize the number of patents and not the amount of licensing revenues, as one might expect. This suggests that TTOs fail to fully understand that royalty sharing can serve as an incentive by providing enhanced revenue opportunities for researchers.
Second, inventors seem to be failing to produce licensable inventions; hence, their lack of response to royalty shares. Inventors applying for patents in international offices
(arguably higher quality patents) seem to care more about royalty sharing. However, only a few university inventors in Portugal and Spain apply for patents in international offices. While the number of patents in Portugal and Spain has grown dramatically in recent years, the quality of these patents might not yet be good enough to generate licensing income. It appears that in both countries, universities are more interested in obtaining patents to enhance their reputation and then in exploiting this reputation premium to foster technology transfer through R&D partnerships with industry. A second possibility could be that patents are being used to strengthen technology transfer through the creation of spin-off firms. In neither of these cases would patenting be related to licensing.
Clearly, a further explanation for the absence of any incentive effects attributable to royalty sharing could be that university scientists are disproportionately driven by traditional academic motivations (i.e., eponymy, prizes and publication). This argument has not been empirically tested in this paper (although it has been taken into account in the analytical model providing the predictions tested herein). Indeed, it should be stressed that in Portugal and Spain more importance has traditionally been attached to academic activities, such as publishing, for obtaining tenure and other career promotions than to patents or licensing. Thus, classic academic incentives can be said to impose a lower bound on the pay-off from commercially oriented research: scientists will only devote effort to producing commercially oriented inventions if the expected 28 We should add that most TTOs, particularly those in Portugal, but also in Spain, are small and still at a very early stage on the learning curve. However, over the last few years, the patenting policies of some TTOs have shifted from a "quantity" to a "quality" strategy. Indeed, a number of TTOs seem now to be more commercially aware of their activities and have attained a critical scale whereby they can successfully license their universities' patents.
gains from so doing are greater than the gains from producing publications (i.e., the possibility of obtaining tenured positions, promotions and eventually wage increases).
Our findings have a number of policy implications. We have shown that inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain are ineffective essentially because inventions offer poor commercial prospects. For royalty shares to be an effective tool, both TTOs and inventors need to acquire greater commercial orientation. For example, TTOs would have to commit themselves to pro-active commercialization practices, including searching for licensees and not just encouraging invention disclosure and undertaking the ensuing administrative tasks (by and large their current roles). Given that most
Portuguese and Spanish firms are not technology based, the demand for licenses is primarily from abroad, which means a successful licensing strategy would require the specific targeting of international licensees. Additionally, for inventor royalty shares to be an effective incentive, scientists will have to become more commercially oriented. In other words, scientists need to be able to produce inventions that can be economically exploited through patenting and licensing.
However, it is not our wish to overstate the policy implications as it might simply not be optimal from a welfare viewpoint to maximize licensing income. Indeed, universities in Spain and Portugal are public and, as such, are likely to prioritize other goals. For instance, they might prefer to maximize regional development, for which there are forms of technology transfer, such as spin-off creation and R&D cooperation agreements, that are likely to better serve this purpose. Spin-offs, for example, tend to locate in the same region as the university from which they emerge thereby guaranteeing regional development (Zhang, 2009; Zucker et al., 1998) . Licensing, on the other hand, only spurs regional development if inventions are licensed to local licensees, which might be at odds with maximizing licensing income. 29 Moreover, universities might prefer their researchers to commit to academic research (which is believed to be a greater source of spillovers than commercially oriented research). Notes: The statistics for Portugal are based on the 212 responses for which we have full information. The statistics for Spain are based on the 606 responses for which we have full information except for the variable "International patent applications" for which we only have information for 573 researchers. The variable "International patent applications" is a dummy variable with value one if the inventor has international patent applications (in the USPTO and EPO offices) and zero otherwise. This was not obtained directly from the survey but from matching the survey with the original database on patents retrieved from the patent offices. All the variables are dummy variables except for "Age" and "Number of sexenios" and we only report standard deviations for these last two variables. a) The number of "Sexenios" is a recognition awarded to Spanish scholars that does not exist in Portugal (see footnote 23 for fuller explanation), the number of international patent applications by scientist is available for Spain but not for Portugal, the fields "Biology" and "Physics" are specific to the Spanish survey. b) The fields "Nutrition" and "Technology and Management" are specific to the Portuguese survey. 37 Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of patent applications and total license revenue. All the regressions include a full set of time dummies. The sample used considers the period 2007-2011 (both years inclusive). Observations 181 84 Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Clustered (at the university level) robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are a dummy variable with value one if the inventor is aware of the inventor royalty share at her university (columns 1-4) and a dummy variable if the inventor claims that the inventor royalty share was of 'high' importance in stimulating her effort (columns 5-8). All the regressions include a full set of university and field dummies. In the regressions we use all the available observations from the surveys for which all the variables needed in the regressions have non-missing values.
